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America's juvenile justice system is failing abysmally. Serious juvenile
crime is skyrocketing. Between 1983 and 1992, the number of juveniles
arrested for murder rose by 128%, and the number arrested for violent
crime rose by 57%.' During that same time period, the murder rate for
male blacks between the ages of fourteen and seventeen rocketed
320%.' During the second half of the 1980s, delinquency cases increased
by 16%.' The most dramatic increase in delinquency cases involved
older juveniles and minority juveniles.' Fully half of these delinquency
cases involved crimes serious enough to be listed as FBI Index offens-
es.' In contrast, during the decade of the 1980s, the most crime-prone
* Henry Salvatori Professor of American Constitutionalism, Department of Govern-
ment, Claremont McKenna College, and Member of the Graduate Faculty, Claremont
Graduate School. B.A., Concordia College, 1968; M.A., University of Chicago, 1971;
Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1973.
1. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS-1993 427 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994) [herein-
after SOURCEBOOK-19931.
2. Id. at 386. In 1983 there were 37 male blacks between the ages of 14 and 17
who committed murder or non-negligent manslaughter per 100,000 people. In 1992,
the number had risen to 119 per 100,000 people, an increase of 320%. Id. Seventy-six
percent of these murder victims were also black. Id.
3. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS-1991 5 (1994).
4. Id. at 27. Delinquency cases involving juveniles 17 years of age and older in-
creased 26%, involving nonwhite juveniles increased 3296, and involving nonwhite juve-
niles 17 years of age and older increased by 40%. See generaUy SOURCEBOOK-1993,
supra note 1.
5. Id. at 5.
age group in the juvenile population, those fifteen to nineteen years of
age, fell by twenty-two percent.'
Overall, juveniles between the ages of ten and eighteen constitute
approximately 14% of the current U.S. population.7 However, according
to FBI statistics released in the fall of 1994, they commit 28.3% of all
Index offenses, 17.3% of all violent crime, and 32.2% of all property
crime.8 Specifically, they commit 14.4% of all murders and non-negli-
gent manslaughters, 14.4% of all aggravated assaults, 15.7% of all forc-
ible rapes, 26% of all robberies, 30.2% of all larcenies, 33.3% of all bur-
glaries, and 43% of all arsons.' More individuals are arrested for proper-
ty crimes at age sixteen than at any other age, and more are arrested
for violent crimes at age eighteen than at any other age.'" Furthermore,
if demography is destiny, the problem is destined to get worse: the
number of juveniles in the most crime-prone age group will increase by
over 13% by the end of the decade."
There are many reasons for this increase in serious juvenile crime,
including the prevalence of gangs and drug use and the coarsening of
American society. Most Americans, however, believe that this increase
is caused by the failure of the juvenile justice system." When asked in
a 1989 Yankelovich Clancy Shulman Poll to identify those factors chief-
ly to blame for teenage violence, 70% of the respondents mentioned "le-
nient treatment of juvenile offenders by the courts."'3 When asked in
the same poll what actions they favored to reduce teenage violence,
79% of all respondents said "tougher criminal penalties for juvenile
offenders."'4 A 1994 Los Angeles Times Poll revealed that 68% of all
respondents (and seventy-one percent of black respondents) believed
that juveniles who commit violent crimes should "be treated the same
as adults."'" Only 13% believed that juveniles should be "given more
lenient treatment."'6
6. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES-1994
14 (114th edition) [hereinafter CENSUS-1994].
7. Id. at 15.
8. SOURCEBOOK-1993, supra note 1, at 436-37.
9. Id.
10. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION
ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 42 (2d. ed., 1988).
11. CENSUS-1994, supra note 6, at 16.
12. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1990 157 (Timothy J. Flanagan &
Kathleen Maguire eds., 1991) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK-1990].
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. SOURCEBOOK-1993, supra note 1, at 196.
16. Id.
[Vol. 22: 907, 19951 "Juvenile Injustice System"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The American public perceives juvenile courts as unable to pre-
vent-in fact, as contributing to-serious juvenile crime. This percep-
tion was confirmed for many in September of 1993," when four teen-
agers were arrested for the murder of a British tourist in Florida. 8 All
four had been arrested before; in fact, a thirteen year-old among them
had been arrested fifteen times on fifty-six charges and at the time of
his first arrest was only eight years old. 9 The juvenile courts, and the.
treatment model on which they are based, are seen as part of a "juve-
nile injustice system" badly in need of fundamental reform. That re-
form, however, has been stymied by the opposition of those who actu-
ally operate and have a vested interest in perpetuating the current sys-
tem. Their interest is considerable: in 1992, juvenile courts in the United
States processed an estimated 1,471,200 delinquence cases, an increase
of 26% in just five years.0
II. THE TREATMENT MODEL: THE SOURCE OF THE INJUSTICE
Juvenile courts were born in 1899 with the passage of the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act and the subsequent establishment of the first juve-
nile court in Chicago.2' The leaders of the juvenile court movement un-
derstood juvenile delinquency, a term broadly defined to include both
criminal acts and non-criminal misbehavior, as a disease peculiar to
childhood. They perceived the purpose of juvenile justice as bringing
children into juvenile courts where this disease could be diagnosed by
experts and where treatment could be prescribed by a judge to meet
the child's individual needs.' The circumstances underlying an act,
rather than the act itself, were the court's primary target.
Julian Mack, a leading figure in the establishment of the Chicago
juvenile court, and one of its first judges, summarized these principles
on the occasion of the court's tenth anniversary in 1909.' The state's
17. CENSUS-1994, supra note 6, at 15.
18. ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Oct. 6, 1993, at Al.
19. Id.
20. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCE PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, DELINQUENCE CASES IN JUVENILE CouRT-1992 1 (Fact Sheet No. 18, July 1994).
21. Seventy percent of state statutes are still modeled on the 1899 Illinois statute.
MARK H. MOORE, FROM CHILDREN TO CITIZENS: THE MANDATE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 51
(1987).
22. ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT
22 (1978).
23. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
duty, he wrote, is to discern the physical, mental, and moral state of the
child o determine whether he is in danger of future criminality.u The
most important consideration, he insisted, "is not, [h]as this boy or girl
committed a specific wrong, but [w]hat is he, how has he become what
he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of
the state to save him from a downward career. "' According to Judge
Mack, juvenile court judges "must be -willing and patient enough to
search out the underlying causes of the trouble and to formulate the
plan by which.., the cure may be effected."'
The leaders of the juvenile court movement wanted the juvenile jus-
tice system to treat delinquents the way pediatric medicine treats chil-
dren. When children become physically ill, they are not blamed for their
misfortune, neither are they stigmatized. Rather, their disease is first
diagnosed, and then they are individually treated by medical profession-
als whose objective is to do what is best for the patient. The children
sometimes have to be separated from society if their disease is conta-
gious or to assure the success of their prescribed treatment, but this
separation is never punitive in nature. Medical personnel are given max-
imum discretion to deal with these patients, reliance is placed on their
professional training, expertise, ingenuity, and good will, not on lock-
step routines or rigid adherence to rules or regulations. Emphasis is
placed not only on restoring the child to health but on effecting those
necessary societal and environmental changes so that future children
will not fall ill. As a result, vaccines are to be developed, swamps are to
be drained, insects and parasites are to be eradicated, cures are to be
found.
The leaders of the juvenile court movement designed the juvenile
courts based on this same treatment model. Some children contract a
disease called juvenile delinquency, but they are no more to be blamed
or stigmatized for this misfortune than are their physically-stricken
counterparts. Instead, juvenile court personnel are to diagnose the na-
ture and cause of the juvenile's disease of delinquency and recommend
to the juvenile court judge, who operates as a physician of sorts, a
treatment to addresses the juvenile's needs. This treatment may require
institutionalization, not as punishment but to ensure the successful
treatment of delinquency and to prevent the spread of the disease to
others.
24. Id. at 107.
25. Id. at 119-20.
26. Id. at 119. According to Mack, the most serious mistake was to deal with
children as criminals, a view he shared with other juvenile court judges. Id. at 111.
See generally CHILDREN'S COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THEIR ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT,
AND RESULT. H.R. Doc. No. 701, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. (1904).
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Just as a physician has the discretion to do what is necessary to save
his patients, the juvenile court judge is authorized, by the purpose
clause of the juvenile court's enabling legislation, to do whatever is "in
the best interest of the child." 7 Just as health professionals are inter-
ested in eradicating the causes of diseases, juvenile justice professionals
must seek to reform society so that the roots of crime and delinquency
can be removed. Juveniles are then expected to assume leadership roles
in their communities and country and to work actively for fundamental
socioeconomic change.
Based on the purposes of the juvenile justice system and the implica-
tions of the treatment model, the juvenile court movement leaders de-
signed an institution that departed from the traditional court of law in
almost every respect. The juvenile court was intended to be an institu-
tion where behavioral specialists could meet to assist children and to
publicize and rectify the complex problems underlying juvenile delin-
quency.' The court's principal concerns were the child's character,
psychology, and home environment. Its mission was to remove young
offenders from criminal courts and to provide them with the care and
supervision typical of that found in a stable and loving family. Because
the juvenile court reformers assumed that the interests of the state,
delinquent children, and their families were identical, they eliminated
the adversarial atmosphere of criminal courts and, along with it, the
procedural safeguards of due process.' They replaced the cold, objec-
tive standards of criminal procedure with informal procedures, based
on parens patriae.
27. The juvenile court movement leaders justified this informality and discretion on
the basis of the equity doctrine of parens patriae. See, e.g., BARBARA D. FLICKER,
INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASS'N, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 29 (1979) (describ-
ing the parens patriae doctrine as when the common guardian of the community
assumes the role of the natural parent) (citing Ex parte Crouse, 4 WHART. 9 (Pa.
1838)). This doctrine originated in the English courts of chancery where the king
could act as "father of his country," exercising protective control over the person and
property of children.
28. ROBERT M. MENNEL, THORNS AND THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1825-1940 156 (1973).
29. Anthony Platt and Sanford Fox have questioned whether the abandonment of
due process was benevolently motivated. See ANTHONY PLAT'r, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An His-
torical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970). But see J. Lawrence Schultz, The
Cycle of Juvenile Court History, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 457 (1973) (criticizing Platt's
and Fox's interpretations of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act).
The juvenile court movement leaders distinguished juvenile courts
from criminal courts in other important respects as well. They devel-
oped a specialized vocabulary through which petitions of delinquency
replaced criminal complaints, hearings replaced trials, adjudications of
delinquency replaced judgments of guilt, and dispositions replaced sen-
tences. The public was excluded from juvenile hearings to protect chil-
dren from the public stigma of a criminal prosecution. Finally, judges
were granted broad discretion to adjudicate delinquency and set dispo-
sitions. The principle underlying the juvenile justice system was to com-
bine flexible decision-making with individualized intervention to treat
and rehabilitate offenders rather than to punish offenses. Juvenile
courts, therefore, were expected to be informal and offender-oriented.
III. CHALLENGES TO THE TREATMENT MODEL
For the first half-century of their existence, juvenile courts functioned
according to these principles with relatively little interference. However,
beginning in the 1950s, scholarly commentaries, United States Supreme
Court decisions, state legislative reactions, and national reform propos-
als all combined to challenge these principles and eventually force sig-
nificant, if piecemeal, changes in both the operation and organization of
the juvenile courts. The challenge began when Paul Tappan, Monrad
Paulsen, and other juvenile justice scholars expressed concern over the
absence of procedural regularity in juvenile courts. These critics did not
attack individualized treatment as the ultimate goal of juvenile justice,
but they did attack the informality of the juvenile justice system in
articles with such provocative titles as "Juvenile Justice: Treatment or
Travesty"' ° and "The Juvenile Court-Benevolence in the Star Cham-
ber.""
These scholarly critiques of the juvenile justice system received im-
portant public support when Chief Justice Earl Warren observed that
the procedural informality of the juvenile courts had "given rise to vex-
ing problems in defining its function and establishing appropriate limits
upon its authority. "' He alarmed juvenile court traditionalists by argu-
ing that juveniles should be entitled to procedural rights comparable to
30. Fred E. Elirod, Jr. & Don H. Melaney, Juvenile Justice: Treatment or Travesty,
11 U. PinT. L. REV. 277 (1950).
31. Mathew J. Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court-Benevolence in the Star Cham-
ber, 50 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 226 (1959). See also Monrad Paulsen,
Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957); PAUL TAPPAN, JUVE-
NILE DELINQUENCY 208, 219-23 (1949).
32. Earl Warren, Equal Justice for Juveniles, 15 JUv. CT. JUDGES J. 1, 14-15 (Fall
1964) (quoting from a 1964 speech to the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges).
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those enjoyed by adults.' While the Chief Justice stopped short of
identifying which elements of criminal due process he believed juve-
niles were to enjoy, he predicted that those elements would be speci-
fied when "proper cases come before the Court."'
In re Gault' was the first in a series of such "proper cases." In
Gault, the Court proclaimed that "[u]nder our Constitution, the condi-
tion of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court"' and held that
juveniles are constitutionally entitled to due process protections en-
joyed by adults such as notice of charges, 7 representation by coun-
sel,' confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses,' and the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. ' Writing for the majority, Justice Abe
Fortas argued that "[tihe absence of substantive standards has not nec-
essarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, individual-
ized treatment.""
The Court, however, did not go as far as many critics had hoped. It
refused to grant juveniles the right to appeal or the right to verbatim
transcripts.42 In addition, the Court's decision applied only to the adju-
dicative phase of delinquency proceedings, where a criminal violation is
alleged and confinement might result, and did not address dependency
or neglect proceedings, nor apply to intake or disposition proceed-
ings.4
Moreover, the Court did not resolve the most controversial issue in
Gault: whether dispositions should be related to specific criminal
acts. 4 A central tenet of the juvenile court movement-articulated so
well by Chicago's Judge Mack-is that the juvenile courts are to focus
on the offender, not the offense. 5 The seriousness of the offense is not
to be linked to the subsequent treatment prescribed.
33. Id. at 14-16.
34. Id. at 15.
35. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
36. Id. at 28.
37. Id. at 33.
38. Id. at 36-37.
39. Id. at 57.
40. Id. at 55.
41. Id. at 18.
42. Id. at 57-58.
43. Id. at 13.
44. See id. at 13.
45. See generally Mack, supra note 23.
For example, a juvenile who commits murder is not to be charged
with, found guilty of, or punished for murder; rather, he is simply to be
adjudicated delinquent and treated in such a way as to cure his disease
of delinquency. His murderous conduct is a symptom of his disease of
delinquency and of his need for individually-tailored treatment to cure
him of that disease. The same view applies to a juvenile who shoplifts;
his misdeed establishes him as a delinquent-no more and no less than
the murderer-and shows him to be equally in need of individualized
treatment to cure his disease. Consequently, the length of treatment and
coerciveness of intervention are determined not by what the juveniles
have done, but by what the juvenile court deems necessary to cure
them of their disease of delinquency.
Critics charged that the juvenile courts' emphasis on the offender
rather than on the offense was unjust.' Focusing only on the offender
was unjust, for it violated the principles of equality (like cases should
be treated alike) and proportionality (the severity of the sanction
should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense) and pro-
duced disparate results based on such irrelevant offender characteris-
tics as race and sex. Scholars noted that a juvenile who committed a
serious crime of violence could receive a disposition of community-
based counseling if he were from an intact, middle-class family living in
a good neighborhood, while another juvenile who committed a minor
property offense could be sent to a secure detention facility for years if
he were diagnosed as incorrigible or was from a broken home or im-
poverished neighborhood.
The Gault majority, however, was unwilling to question the justice of
the treatment model's offender-orientation. It was content to balance
the "constitutional domestication" of juvenile court procedures with the
juvenile justice system's traditional social welfare concerns." Indeed,
the Court expressed confidence that its ruling would "not compel the
States to abandon or displace any of [what it characterized as] the sub-
stantive benefits of the juvenile process."' The court expected that its
decision would produce immediate benefits for juveniles in the form of
constitutional protection against unfair procedures without having any
long-term negative impact on the special nature of juvenile courts.49
46. See, e.g., Francis E. McCarthy, Should Juvenile Delinquency Be Abolished? 23
CRIME & DELINQ. 196 (1977). These criticisms are summarized in H. Ted Rubin, Re-
tain the Juvenile Court? Legislative Developments, Reform Directions, and the Call
for Abolition, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 281 (1979).
47. Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.
48. Id. at 21.
49. See id. at 21-27 (explaining the potential effect of procedural requirements on
the juvenile courts).
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The Court in Gault sought to formalize juvenile court procedures
while keeping them offender-oriented. Its objective was to legalize the
adjudicative phase of delinquency proceedings without affecting, and
certainly without questioning, the justice of the juvenile court's empha-
sis on individualized rehabilitation in other areas and proceedings. This
objective continued to guide the Court in subsequent "proper cases."
Thus, in In re Winship,' the Court required that delinquency be prov-
en beyond a reasonable doubt,5 and in Breed v. Jones,' it required
that waiver hearings precede adjudication hearings. ' On the other
hand, it found, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,' that juveniles do not
possess the right to jury trials, ' and in Fare v. Michael C., ' that a
juvenile's request to speak to a probation officer does not invoke Fifth
Amendment protections under Miranda v. Arizona.57
In each of these cases, the Court sought to preserve the delicate
balance between what it called "the 'informality' and 'flexibility"'' that
it believed was necessary for rehabilitation and "the 'fundamental
fairness' demanded by the Due Process Clause." ' Demonstrating the
judiciary's institutional incapacity to resolve complex policy ques-
tions,5' the Court was unaware that the higher procedural standards it
mandated would impair the rehabilitative mission of the juvenile courts.
The Court's decisions were felt not only through the specific proce-
dural reforms mandated but also through the new understanding of the
mental capacity of juveniles that was implicitly communicated."' In
50. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
51. Id. at 368.
52. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
53. Id. at 537-38.
54. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
55. Id. at 545.
56. 422 U.S. 707 (1979).
57. Id. at 724; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
366 (1970)).
59. Id. (quoting Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975)).
60. See generally DONALD L. HOROWrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977);
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991); TiOMA~s SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS (1980); Ralph A. Rossum, Weber
and the Limits of Judicial Policy-Making, 4 L. & POL'Y Q. 95 (1982). For a contrast-
ing point of view, see Ralph Cavanagh and Austin Sarat, Thinking About Courts:
Towards and Beyond a Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14 L & SOC. REV. 371
(1980) and Stephen Wasby, Arrogation of Power or Accountability: Judicial Imperial-
ism Revisited, 65 JUDICATURE 208 (1981).
61. See Gary B. Melton, Litigation in the Interest of Children: Does Anybody
Gault, for example, Justice Fortas argued that one purpose of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination is to promote equality between individu-
als and the state.' By extending the privilege to juveniles as well, he
placed them in virtually the same relationship as adults with regard to
the state. While this granted juveniles access to previously unavailable
procedural rights, it also imputed to them a greater presumption of
responsible behavior. Additionally, this extension opened the way to a
reconceptualization of juvenile justice in which juveniles could be held
more explicitly accountable for their acts.
State legislatures responded to the Court's explicit demand for more
formal juvenile court procedures and its implicit message that juveniles
must likewise be held responsible for their actions by revising their
juvenile codes. Several redrafted their purpose clauses to reflect the
concerns of both public safety and juvenile accountability.' For exam-
ple, an important objective introduced into Minnesota's code is "to
promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency by maintain-
ing the integrity of the substantive law by prohibiting certain behavior
and by developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior."" Simi-
larly, California's delinquency provisions now charge the juvenile courts
with "protect[ing] the public from criminal conduct by minors" and
"impos[ing] on the minor a sense of responsibility for his or her own
acts." ' Other states have left unchanged the purpose clauses of their
juvenile codes but have expanded juvenile due process rights beyond
what the Supreme Court has mandated. Twenty-eight states now explic-
itly grant juveniles the right to verbatim transcripts of proceedings,'
twelve provide for jury trials in juvenile courts, 7 and seventeen permit
Win? 10 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 337, 345 (1986).
62. Gault, 387 U.S. at 42-57.
63. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 902 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001 (West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
3002 (West 1982-83); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.001 (West 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
246 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010 (West 1983-84).
64. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 39.011 (West 1982).
65. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1983).
66. See RALPH A. ROSSUM, ET AL., JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM: A MODEL FOR THE
STATES 113 (1987) (comparing the juvenile codes of all 50 states on 251 separate
practices and procedures from court structure to admissibility of physical characteris-
tics). The states are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.; see also BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS-1988 154-56 (Katherine M. Jamieson & Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1989)
[hereinafter SOURCEBOOK-1988].
67. SOURCEBOOK-1988, supra note 65, at 112. These states are: Alaska, Colorado,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, West Vir-
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bail in some circumstances.' Only four states continue categorically to
prohibit public trials.6
In addition to these procedural changes, state legislatures have also
restricted the definition of delinquency to include only conduct that
would be a crime if committed by an adult. They have also narrowed
the juvenile courts' jurisdiction, principally by lowering the age and
revising the procedures by which juvenile courts can waive jurisdiction
and transfer juveniles to criminal courts. Twenty-seven states now per-
mit waiver of juveniles to criminal courts at age fourteen or lower.'0
Legislatures have also excluded certain offenses or offense histories
from juvenile court jurisdiction altogether (legislative waiver) and have
created concurrent jurisdictions, permitting prosecutors to choose
whether to proceed in juvenile or criminal court (prosecutorial waiver).
These waiver provision amendments reflect the wish of legislatures to
incorporate accountability into juvenile justice, although a study of New
York State's revised waiver provisions serve as a firm reminder that a
wish is not a fact.7 This study found that there is a tendency for adult
courts to treat defendants who are transferred from juvenile courts as
first-time offenders, regardless of the length or seriousness of the juve-
nile record."2 As a consequence, most serious juvenile offenders tried
in criminal courts received sanctions less severe than they could have
received in the juvenile courts.73 In fact, only four percent received
more severe sanctions than they otherwise could have received.7"
ginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
68. Id. at 109. These states are: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Geor-
gia, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia Id.
69. Id. at 112. These states are: Illinois, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Utah.
70. RossuM, supra note 66, at 106. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Ver-
mont, and Wyoming. Id.
71. CITIZENS' COMMITTIEE FOR CHILDREN OF NEW YORK, THE EXPERIMENT THAT FAILED:
THE NEW YORK JUVENILE OFFENDER LAW-A STUDY REPORT (1984) [hereinafter
CITIZENS' STUDY]. See also Barry C. Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy:
Just Deserts and the Waiver Decision, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 195, 206 (1983); Joan
Petersilia, Juvenile Record Use in Adult Court Proceedings: A Survey of Prosecutors,
72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1746-71 (1981).
72. See generally, CITIZENS' STUDY, supra note 71.
73. Id.
74. Id.
IV. CALLS FOR FUNDAMENTAL REFORM
For the most part, post-Gault legislation has been piecemeal and
reactive. Legislatures have transformed juvenile courts so that they now
function more like criminal courts rather than social welfare agen-
cies.75 Basically, however, the juvenile courts remain what they have
always been, an institution based on the medical or treatment model.
Therefore, they continue to focus on the offender rather than the of-
fense. Juvenile courts still seek to individualize sanctions and thereby
continue to obscure any relationship between an act and its conse-
quences. They still characterize dispositions as treatment rather than
punishment, and they still prevent the threat of punishment from being
communicated to other potential offenders through closed proceedings.
The result is a continuing erosion of the general deterrent value of their
sanctions. As a result, juvenile courts still violate principles of equality
and proportionality, and therefore act as instruments of injustice.7'
These criticisms, together with the growing realization that the juve-
nile justice system is an early twentieth century institution hopelessly
ill-equipped to deal with late twentieth century violent juvenile offend-
ers, have led thoughtful critics to call for fundamental juvenile justice
reform based on Andrew von Hirsch's "justice model."7 Organizations
75. See Barry Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the
New Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141 (1984); Andrew Walkover, The Infancy
Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REv. 503, 517-33 (1984).
76. See supra notes 1-20 and accompanying text (discussing the inequality of juve-
nile courts).
77. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 45-46
(1976) (arguing that "desert," rather than the three classic aims of deterrence, inca-
pacitation, or rehabilitation, should serve as the primary justification for punishment).
Von Hirsch argues that specific punishments should be imposed on offenders accord-
ing to the principle of commensurate deserts. Id. (using the term "deserts" to concep-
tualize the idea that people should get what they deserve). Sentences should be de-
termined by the seriousness of an offense and the number and seriousness of prior
convictions rather than by the potential utility of sentences in crime prevention. Id.
at 69-71, 84-87.
Von Hirsch also proposes that a sentencing policy based on commensurate
deserts should contain five components: (1) presumptive sentences should replace
indeterminate sentences; (2) sentencing guidelines should be adopted in which the
relative seriousness of various offenses and their corresponding sentences are speci-
fied; (3) the number and seriousness of prior offenses should be more directly relat-
ed to increases in the severity of the presumptive sentence for each offense; (4)
judges should have the option to order sentences above or below the presumptive
sentence, but only within a prescribed range and under specified circumstances; and
(5) sentencing guidelines should include general principles of aggravation and miti-
gation. Id. at 99-100.
See also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993); ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES (1985); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE,
[Vol. 22: 907, 1995] "Juvenile Injustice System"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
such as the Institute of Judicial Administration (IJA) and the American
Bar Association (ABA)'8 and the Twentieth Century Fund, through its
Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders,"" argue that
the informal, offender-oriented treatment model must be replaced with
a formal, offense-oriented model based on the principles of equality and
proportionality. Such a justice model seeks to achieve the twin goals of
holding juveniles individually responsible for their criminal misdeeds
and holding the juvenile justice system accountable for its treatment of
these juveniles.
The justice model pursues individual responsibility by closely linking
dispositions to delinquent acts and by utilizing dispositions, such as
restitution, that encourage juveniles to recognize their obligations to the
community and to the victims of their criminal acts.' 1t pursues sys-
tem accountability through its insistence that dispositions must be limit-
ed, deserved, uniform, and justified. To ensure that similarly-situated of-
fenders are treated similarly and that the most serious offenders receive
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971).
78. See FUCKER, supra note 27. The IJA and the ABA jointly drafted 23 volumes of
juvenile justice standards. Id. at 15. These volumes rejected any parens patriae justi-
fication for intervention into juveniles' lives, advocated procedural formality in juve-
nile court proceedings, and recommended determinate dispositions regulated by the
requirements of equality and proportionality. Id. at 22-23. The IJA-ABA standards also
called for reductions in judicial discretion and larger roles for both prosecutors and
defense attorneys. Id. at 39-40.
79. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME (1978). The
Task Force concluded that the principles of culpability and proportionality, along with
traditional concepts of diminished responsibility according to age, should guide sen-
tencing decisions. Id.
80. Anne L. Schneider & Peter R. Schneider, A Comparison of Programmatic and
Ad Hoc Restitution in Juvenile Courts, 1 JUST. Q. 529 (1984). Restitution was not
extensively used in juvenile courts until the late 1970s when individual judges began
to include it in disposition orders. Id. By the mid-1980s, however, a large number of
jurisdictions had established formal restitution programs. Id. Restitution attracts atten-
tion because of its potential for holding juveniles responsible, responding to victims'
rights concerns, and avoiding incarceration. Id. It attracts support because of favor-
able research findings on the way restitution orders impact recidivism. Id. Where
restitution is implemented through formal programs, rather than through ad hoc or-
ders with little support structure, completion rates are high and recidivism rates are
reduced. Id. Completion rates are also higher, and recidivism lower, when restitution
is used as a sole sanction rather than in association with other conditions of proba-
tion. Anne L. Schneider & Peter R. Schneider, The Impact of Restitution on Recidi-
vism of Juvenile Offenders: An Experiment in Clayton County, Georgia, 10 CRiM.
JUST. REV. 1, 9 (1985); see also Peter R. Schneider et al., Juvenile Restitution as a
Sole Sanction or Condition of Probation, 19 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 47 (1982).
the most punitive sanctions, it relies on the use of presumptive and
determinate dispositions. Thus, the disposition in any case depends
upon the nature and gravity of the criminal offense, the age of the of-
fender, and the number, recency, and seriousness of any prior offens-
es.8' Also, consistent with accountability, the justice model provides
the public with the opportunity to scrutinize the performance of juve-
nile courts through its requirements that all hearings and all records
(other than the juvenile's social file) be open to the public.
The State of Washington was the first state to embrace the justice
model.' Its 1977 Juvenile Justice Act and subsequent amendments
comprehensively reformed its juvenile justice system along the lines of
individual responsibility and system accountability.' The intent of the
Washington Act is to hold juveniles "accountable for their offenses" and
to establish a juvenile justice system that is "capable of having primary
responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the needs of
youthful offenders .. . ."' Sanctions against juveniles must be limited,
deserved, and proportionate.
To implement these policy goals, the Washington Act shifted the
responsibility for intake from probation officers to prosecutors and
established legal criteria to guide intake decisions.' It also formalized
pre-trial diversion, specifying that diversion must be offered to certain
categories of offenders, and made payment of restitution, either directly
to the victim or by service to the community, the preferred diversion
alternative (as opposed to counseling, recreation, or educational assis-
tance).' Finally, it established juvenile sentencing standards, mandat-
ing presumptive and determinate sentences proportionate to the seri-
ousness of the offense and the offender's age and prior offense
history. 7 The standards included a list of offenses by degree of seri-
ousness; established a point system in which points are assigned by age
81. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 256 (1985). The justice model rejects
the treatment model without rejecting the importance of treatment. Id. The justice
model views rehabilitation as a benefit of the treatment service rendered, not as a
factor in determining the length of a sentence. Id. Under the justice model, juveniles
who might require a program of treatment beyond the duration of their presumptive
and determinate dispositions could not be held in secure confinement or assigned to
probation for a period of time longer than justified by their present offense, age, and
offense history. Id. They would, however, be encouraged to continue in treatment
programs voluntarily after they had completed the conditions and requirements of
their dispositions. Id.
82. See WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (West 1984).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 13.40.025.
86. Id. § 13.40.080.
87. Id. § 13.40.150.
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and offense severity, and in which offense history serves as a multiplier
of the base point level for each offense; and mandated that a juvenile's
resulting point total determine the appropriate disposition. The juvenile
court judge may depart from this determination only upon a written
finding that the disposition would be manifestly unjust--either to the
juvenile by being too severe, or to the community by being too le-
nient.'
In the mid-1980s, two social scientists, Anne Schneider and Donna
Schramm, completed an extensive evaluation of the implementation and
impact of the Washington Act.' They found that the new legislation
produced significant changes in organizational responsibilities through-
out the juvenile justice system.' Informal adjustment at juvenile court
intake, for example, was eliminated as a result of the participation of
prosecutors and the use of legal variables to determine intake deci-
sions." Formal court diversion programs replaced informal adjust-
ment.' Additionally, the use of presumptive and determinate sentenc-
ing standards resulted in greater equality, proportionality, and predict-
ability of dispositions.' The sentencing standards contributed to an
increase in the certainty that juvenile offenders would be held account-
able by some type of sanction--Schneider and Schramm observed a
fifty percent increase in the proportion of juveniles held accountable in
the period immediately following 1977.' The standards also led, how-
ever, to a decrease in the overall severity of sanctions.' While violent
and serious/chronic offenders were more likely to be institutionalized
under the new Act, nonviolent first offenders and chronic minor prop-
erty offenders were less likely to be institutionalized than before.'
Moreover, because the 1977 reforms rely more heavily on restitution,
community service, and less-secure local detention than on commitment
to state institutions, the average daily population at state juvenile insti-
tutions was approximately the same in 1985 as in 1976.' Therefore,
88. Id. § 13.40.0357.
89. Anne Schneider & Donna Schramm, The Washington State Juvenile Justice
System Reform: A Review of Findings, 1 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 211 (1986).
90. Id. at 221.
91. Id. at 221-22.
92. Id. at 222.
93. Id. at 222-23.
94. Id. at 225.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 227-28.
97. Id. at 229-32.
only the kind, not the number, of juveniles held in state institutions
changed. Schneider and Schramm also found high compliance with the
sentencing standards: ninety-five percent of all cases were sentenced
within the presumptive range.'
V. JUVENILE JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS: OPPONENTS OF REFORM
Despite the promising results of the State of Washington's formal,
offense-oriented juvenile code and despite the obvious failures of treat-
ment-based "juvenile injustice" systems, states have failed to follow
Washington's lead by engaging in fundamental and systematic juvenile
court reform based on the principles of individual responsibility and
system accountability. Survey research explains why: juvenile justice
professionals, many of whom are influential in state politics, oppose
any efforts to limit their discretion or to increase their accountability
for their actions.
As part of a research project funded by the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice for which I was the principal investigator, Christopher Manfredi of
McGill University and I conducted a national survey of juvenile justice
professionals to gauge their attitudes toward juvenile justice reform.'
The survey's 8355 respondents were nationally distributed, with each
state's proportion of the sample closely approximating its proportion of
the U.S. population. The respondents included 792 legal professionals
(i.e., judges and attorneys), 679 probation or parole officers, 594 social
service employees, 3331 law enforcement officers, and 2922 other pro-
fessionals (e.g., criminal justice professors and researchers, correctional
officers).
The questionnaire itself consisted of seventy-four substantive ques-
tions, thirty-nine of which concerned attitudes and policy preferences.
Three questions asked respondents to indicate their perception of juve-
nile crime as a problem and to evaluate how well it has been dealt with
compared to other problems. The questionnaire also asked respondents
to evaluate the performance of seven organizations and institutions in-
volved in juvenile issues, including juvenile courts, state legislatures,
and the police.'" The survey data revealed that while these respon-
dents believe that juvenile crime is a serious problem, is becoming
more serious, and is handled poorly, they resist change and insist on
98. Id. at 215.
99. ROSSUM, supra note 66, at 124-62. The survey instrument was mailed to all
professionals whose names appear on the National Criminal Justice Reference Service
(NCJRS). Id. at 124. The returned questionnaires yielded a sample of 8355 respons-
es-a response rate of 22.2 percent. Id.
100. Id. at 157-60.
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keeping intact the juvenile court's informal, discretionary decision-mak-
ing.1
0
The respondents' orientation toward traditional and accountability
approaches to juvenile justice was measured by using SPSSX reliability
analysis to construct two scales. The first is an "Offense Orientation
Scale," measuring the extent to which they believed that juvenile courts
should focus on the nature of the offense rather than on the offender's
needs (See Table 1). The six items from the survey used to construct
the "Offense Orientation Scale" (alpha = .7326) involve statements on
the function of juvenile courts and the juvenile justice system, as well
as appropriate responses to juvenile crime." The second is a "Proce-
dural Formality Scale,""° measuring the extent to which they believed
that juvenile courts should be formal and rule-driven as opposed to
informal and discretionary (See Table 2). The six items from the survey
used to construct the "Procedural Formality Scale" (alpha = .6665) in-
volve statements related to procedural issues, such as the right of ju-
veniles to request trials by juries. The mean responses to all twelve
scale items reveal considerable variation among the various profession-
al groups represented in the sample (See Table 3). Nevertheless, one
generalization is possible: The respondents as a group favor reforms
fundamentally at odds with those sought by the Supreme Court in
Gault and subsequent cases, in that they are more strongly offense-ori-
ented than favorably disposed toward procedural formality. Out of a
possible score of 36.00, they have a mean score of 25.67 on the orienta-
tion scale but only a mean score of 22.00 on the formality scale (See
Table 4).
Unlike the justices who sought to create a juvenile justice system that
is formal and offender-oriented, the respondents are willing to accept
juvenile courts that are more offense-oriented, so long as their own dis-
cretion is preserved. Put in the least-flattering light, they are more will-
ing to hold juveniles responsible for their acts than they are to hold
themselves accountable for what they do to these juveniles. Among the
various professional groups represented in the sample, law enforcement
101. Id.
102. Collectively, these items measure the respondent's offense orientation. The
higher the score, the more the respondent believes that juvenile courts should focus
on the nature of the offense rather than on the offender's needs.
103. The higher the score on the formality scale, the more likely the respondent is
to believe that juvenile courts should rely on formal, rule-driven decision-making rath-
er than continue the traditional reliance on informal, discretionary decision-making.
personnel, who would benefit from the more predictable decision-mak-
ing process that a formal rules-driven system would foster, scored the
highest on the formality scale. They also tended to view juvenile crime
as a more serious problem than did the other professional groups, and
saw it as handled poorly by the juvenile courts and by state legislatures
(see Table 5). Not surprisingly, judges, attorneys, and probation/parole
personnel scored the lowest on the formality scale, as they have the
most to lose if juvenile courts become more formalized and their discre-
tion is reduced. They also tended to believe that the problem of juvenile
crime is less serious and is already effectively addressed.
These findings are consistent with what other scholars have learned
from research into the attitudes of juvenile justice professionals con-
ducted in such diverse jurisdictions as San Diego County, Kansas, Illi-
nois, and Minnesota.'" They are also confirmed by the experience of
Washington State.' 5 When Schneider and Schramm surveyed juvenile
justice professionals in twenty of Washington State's counties concern-
ing attitudes toward the enactment and implementation of Washington's
juvenile reform law, they found that the judges were the least support-
ive of the Act."u In fact, it was only because of the rare political skills
of King County's prosecutor that the law was adopted, in the face of
opposition from the state's juvenile court judges. In most states, howev-
er, the judges have prevailed, and fundamental reform based on the
principles of individual responsibility and system accountability has
been stymied. The few reforms achieved thus far have been endorsed
by juvenile court judges and other juvenile justice professionals-but
only because these measures have preserved high levels of discretion.
They have, as a consequence, done little to remove the injustice of the
current system.
Serious juvenile offender statutes, passed by eight states including
California, New York, Illinois, and Colorado,' 7 illustrate the point. On
one level, these laws are offense-oriented and therefore promote indi-
104. See Richard Ariessohn, Offense v. Offender in Juvenile Court, 23 Juv. JuST. 17
(1972); William Arnold, Grass Roots Justice in Middle America: The County Courts
in Kansas, 11 KAN. J. Soc. 16 (1975); Randall E. Schumacker & Dennis R. Anderson,
An Attitude Factor in Juvenile Court Decisionmaking, 31 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 31
(1979); Norman G. Kittel, Juvenile Justice Philosophy in Minnesota, 34 Juv. & FAM.
CT. J. 93 (1983). Kittel found, in his study of juvenile court judges in Minnesota, that
when asked to decide a hypothetical case, only one judge in five chose an account-
ability-oriented disposition. Id. at 101.
105. See William C. Smith, Contemporary Child Saving: A Study of Juvenile Justice
Decision-Making, 34 JUv. & FAm. CT. J. 63, 72 (1983). A survey of both professional
and lay public juvenile justice policymakers reported similar findings. Id.
106. ANNE SCHNEIDER & DONNA SCHRAMM, AN ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE RE-
FORM IN WASIIINGTON STATE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 30-31 (1983).
107. The other four states are Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, and North Carolina.
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vidual responsibility; they single out serious and violent offenders for
differential, and less rehabilitative treatment, handling them within the
juvenile court's own jurisdiction and imposing sanctions based on the
seriousness of their offenses."° On a more basic level, however, these
laws do not advance the interests of either individual responsibility or
system accountability, but rather, preserve the discretion of juvenile
justice professionals. They limit the application of the principles of
responsibility and accountability to serious offenders only, while pre-
serving the traditional informality and discretionary decisionmaking of
the treatment model in all other cases. Not surprisingly, the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ), the profession-
al association of juvenile court judges, has endorsed such statutes, as
they pose no real threat to their judicial discretion. The NCJFCJ viewed
these statutes as an acceptable and necessary concession to state legis-
lators, under mounting public pressure to hold serious juvenile offend-
ers responsible for their actions. However, in a special issue of its na-
tional journal devoted to serious juvenile offenders, the NCJFCJ made
clear its continued opposition to true accountability-based reforms by
declaring defiantly that "proposals which would materially and adverse-
ly alter traditional individualized rehabilitative models and treatment
philosophies of the juvenile justice system are unacceptable. Juvenile
justice resources should accordingly primarily continue to be directed
toward individualized treatment.""
VI. CONCLUSION
It is the unwillingness of juvenile court judges and other juvenile
justice professionals to relinquish their discretion and to account pub-
licly for their actions that stands in the way of fundamental reform.
Their steadfast commitment to the treatment model ensures that the
juvenile courts will remain instruments of "juvenile injustice" in which
the law is applied unequally and disproportionately and neither means
what it says nor says what it means. The juvenile courts fail to teach
juveniles that they will be held responsible for their criminal acts; that
108. Martin L. Forst et al., Indeterminate and Determinate Sentencing of Juvenile
Delinquents: A National Survey of Approaches to Commitment and Release Decision-
Making, 36 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1985).
109. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, The Juvenile Court and
Serious Offenders: 38 Recommendations, 35 Juv. & FAm. CT. J. 1 (Special Issue,
Summer, 1984).
the more serious and frequent their acts, the more responsible they will
be held; and that the older they are, the more responsible they will be
expected to be. As a consequence, serious juvenile crime is soaring
while the public's confidence in juvenile justice is plummeting. The
adult criinal justice system is groaning under the weight of this failure
as well, for juvenile offenders are reaching the age of majority with no
graduated instruction in what the law expects of them. As a tragic con-
sequence, they are ill-prepared to face the full force of adult criminal
responsibility, for the juvenile courts have led them to believe that they
are somehow immune to the law's force and sanctions.
Robert Michels is famous for having remarked: "Who says organiza-
tion, says oligarchy."".. He could have been speaking of the juvenile
courts. The judges, attorneys, and probation and parole personnel who
operate the juvenile courts would rather preserve their discretion than
make their institutions more just. Until they are willing to put the pub-
lic interest ahead of their professional power, fundamental and proven
reform that could transform the juvenile courts into true instruments of
juvenile justice will continue to be frustrated.
110. ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL
TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 401 (1915).
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Table 1








The juvenile court puts too much
emphasis on rehabilitation.
Some juvenile offenses should re-
quire automatic transfer to adult
courts.
The child's welfare is more important
than the nature of his offense.
Social services and counseling are
the best responses to juvenile crime.
Set mandatory minimum penalties
for certain offenses.
Guidelines focused on accountability
and on fitting the severity of the dis-
position to the severity of the pres-
ent and past offenses should be
adopted to reduce dispositional dis-
parity.













Juveniles charged with serious offense
should have a right to trial by a jury
adults in the juvenile court.
Include prosecutor participation in a
decisions after initial apprehension.
Eliminate indeterminate sentences.
Limit the discretion exercised by judge
in sentencing decisions.
Use explicit criteria to guide all decision
after apprehension.
All juveniles to request trial by jury i
the juvenile court.
*SDA=Strongly disagree, SA=Strongly agree
**UI=Unimportant, CI=Critically important
Variable Statement
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Table 3


















1 2 3 4 5 6
3.23 4.87 2.82 2.92 4.24 5.02
2.86 4.32 2.85 2.87 3.17 4.57
3.02 4.62 2.91 3.17 3.85 4.95
2.41 4.38 3.21 3.58 3.92 4.82
3.75 5.37 2.66 2.59 4.79 5.26
Formality Variables
7 8 9 10 11 12
3.68 4.24 3.54 3.44 3.95 3.16
3.18 4.15 3.05 2.43 3.38 2.74
3.32 3.76 3.14 3.00 3.66 3.08
3.68 3.77 3.53 3.57 3.96 3.52








Total Sample 25.67 22.00
Legal 23.04 18.65
Probation/Parole 24.21 19.74
Social Services 22.64 21.56
Law Enforcement 27.82 22.61
Others 24.40 22.10












Mean Response by Profession
Legal Probation/ Social
Parole Services Ei
7.73 8.11 8.07
4.07 4.27 4.02
2.74 2.82 2.90
3.96 3.69
*l0-point scale
**6-point scale
Law
nforcement
8.25
3.60
2.60
3.17
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Others
8.03
3.80
2.76
3.49

